Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 40 No. 1, 2025.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp40106
What is a Genuine Mathematical Explanation in Empirical Science?
Vladimir Drekalović
orcid.org/0000-0001-9046-1596
; University of Montenegro, Faculty of Philosophy, Danila Bojovića bb, Me–81400 Nikšić
Sažetak
The question presented in the title of this paper was posed by Daniele Molinini almost a decade ago, with the contention that the answer to it had not been clearly articulated until that point. The heightened prevalence of the term genuine mathematical explanation can be traced back to Alan Baker’s paper published approximately two decades ago. Regrettably, even today, after two decades, we can hardly say that there has been a significant advancement in the comprehension of the conceptual nuances of this term. Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument, in contrast to the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument, is founded on the significance of mathematical explanation within the realm of science, specifically emphasizing the role of what is termed as genuine mathematical explanation. This concept is cited by authors advocating for Platonist perspectives, as well as by those who maintain nominalist viewpoints. We will scrutinize the interpretations of this term offered by three authors, endeavoring to identify commonalities, with the hope that our analysis may contribute modestly to the crystallization of its meaning, aligning as closely as feasible with intuition.
Ključne riječi
philosophy of mathematics; mathematical Platonism; enhanced indispensability argument; genuine mathematical explanation
Hrčak ID:
332055
URI
Datum izdavanja:
11.6.2025.
Posjeta: 778 *