Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.20901/an.22.04
Kant’s Postulate of Public Right
Domagoj Vujeva
; Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
Abstract
In distinction to the earlier natural law tradition, Kant does not conceive the exit from the state of nature and entering the civil condition as a council of prudence or God’s command, but as a moral duty or an a priori requirement of pure practical reason. Such a moral grounding of the move from the state of nature to a civil condition is reconstructed in this article through three elements of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. First, Kant does not derive the innate right to freedom from our desire for self-preservation or some other (alleged) natural inclination, but from the “humanity” in our person, which is ultimately founded in rational freedom, or our capacity for moral self-legislation. Second, the acquired right (or right to property) is seen as necessary for the full exercise of our outer freedom and not as an instrument of achieving some external end (e.g. satisfaction of needs, utility). Third, both rights (acquired directly and innate indirectly) are considered under the assumption of the state of nature. Considered rationally, this is a state in which we can never be secure from mutual violence because in the absence of public authority everyone is entitled to use coercion against others at their own discretion and unilaterally. The state of nature is “unrightful” because right demands that the freedom of choice of one can be united with choice of others in accordance with a universal law. Since freedom is by definition impossible in the state of nature, pure practical reason commands the following unconditionally, i.e. independently of any interest and exclusively from the standpoint of freedom: exeundum e statu naturali.
Keywords
moral autonomy; innate right; acquired right; state of nature; civil condition
Hrčak ID:
336690
URI
Publication date:
23.10.2025.
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