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https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105

A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others

Thaddeus Metz   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0001-9861-2408 ; University of Pretoria, Department of Philosophy 20–10, Humanities Building, Private Bag X20, Hatfield, ZA–0028 Pretoria

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (368 KB) str. 65-81 preuzimanja: 0* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 21.06.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 21.06.2021.];36(1):65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 65-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Puni tekst: hrvatski, pdf (368 KB) str. 80-80 preuzimanja: 0* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). Relacijska teorija mentalnog zdravlja – manjkanje identifikacije ili solidarnosti s drugima. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 80-80. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "Relacijska teorija mentalnog zdravlja – manjkanje identifikacije ili solidarnosti s drugima." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 80-80. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 21.06.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "Relacijska teorija mentalnog zdravlja – manjkanje identifikacije ili solidarnosti s drugima." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 80-80. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'Relacijska teorija mentalnog zdravlja – manjkanje identifikacije ili solidarnosti s drugima', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 80-80. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. Relacijska teorija mentalnog zdravlja – manjkanje identifikacije ili solidarnosti s drugima. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 21.06.2021.];36(1):80-80. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "Relacijska teorija mentalnog zdravlja – manjkanje identifikacije ili solidarnosti s drugima", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 80-80, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Puni tekst: francuski, pdf (368 KB) str. 81-81 preuzimanja: 0* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale – un défaut d’identification ou de solidarité avec les autres. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale – un défaut d’identification ou de solidarité avec les autres." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 21.06.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale – un défaut d’identification ou de solidarité avec les autres." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale – un défaut d’identification ou de solidarité avec les autres', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale – un défaut d’identification ou de solidarité avec les autres. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 21.06.2021.];36(1):81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale – un défaut d’identification ou de solidarité avec les autres", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 81-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Puni tekst: njemački, pdf (368 KB) str. 81-81 preuzimanja: 0* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit – mangelnde Identifikation oder Solidarität mit Anderen. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit – mangelnde Identifikation oder Solidarität mit Anderen." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 21.06.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit – mangelnde Identifikation oder Solidarität mit Anderen." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit – mangelnde Identifikation oder Solidarität mit Anderen', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit – mangelnde Identifikation oder Solidarität mit Anderen. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 21.06.2021.];36(1):81-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit – mangelnde Identifikation oder Solidarität mit Anderen", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 81-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105

Sažetak
In this paper, I aim to progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large sub-set of those with a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising theory of mental illness, we must go beyond the dominant western accounts of mental illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/ liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second major claim is that the relational facets of mental illness are plausibly understood theoretically in terms of a person’s inability to identify with others or exhibit solidarity with them, relational values salient in the African philosophical tradition. I show that these two extrinsic properties explain several intuitive instances of mental illness well, including, amongst several others, being abusive, psychopathic, narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, and phobic.

Ključne riječi
intrinsic; extrinsic; mental health; mental illness; neurosis; philosophy of psychology; relational disorders; relational values

Hrčak ID: 257909

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/257909

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